Understanding Area of Mutual Interest,
Preferential Rights and Maintenance of
Uniform Interest Provisions in Joint
Operating Agreements by Slattery, Gerald F., Jr. & Landry, Amanda Davis
Annual Institute on Mineral Law
Volume 56 The 56th Annual Institute on Mineral Law Article 16
4-2-2009
Understanding Area of Mutual Interest, Preferential
Rights and Maintenance of Uniform Interest
Provisions in Joint Operating Agreements
Gerald F. Slattery Jr.
Amanda Davis Landry
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Mineral Law Institute at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annual Institute on Mineral Law by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Slattery, Gerald F. Jr. and Landry, Amanda Davis (2009) "Understanding Area of Mutual Interest, Preferential Rights and Maintenance
of Uniform Interest Provisions in Joint Operating Agreements," Annual Institute on Mineral Law: Vol. 56 , Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol56/iss1/16
Understanding Area of Mutual Interest,
Preferential Rights and Maintenance of
Uniform Interest Provisions in Joint
Operating Agreements
Gerald F. Slattery, Jr.
Amanda Davis Landry
Schully, Roberts, Slattery & Marino
New Orleans, Louisiana
I. Introduction
When establishing joint ventures or operations for the exploration
and/or production of oil and gas, parties typically enter into written
agreements, known as joint operating agreements, designed to direct and
manage the myriad of issues raised in these ventures. The joint operating
agreement designates an operator, who is authorized to act on the behalf
of the nonoperators, and specifies each working interest owner's rights
and obligations in the joint operation.' Issues addressed by the operating
agreement include the potential for future acquisitions of mineral inter-
ests in the area and the ability to have some continued control over the
parties involved in the development and operation of the property. In an
attempt to accomplish these goals, parties have included provisions in
joint operating agreements which govern the ability to alienate and pur-
chase property under the purview of the instant agreement. When draft-
ing these provisions, the parties sometimes use all-purpose language
found in sample agreements, which may not address their specific needs
and goals in this joint operation. Careful understanding and drafting of
these restrictive provisions is necessary to avoid future problems regard-
ing their interpretation and application.
This paper will examine three primary categories of restrictions on
acquisition and alienation found in oil and gas joint operating agree-
ments: areas of mutual interest, preferential rights to purchase, and main-
tenance of uniform interests. A general explanation of the principles and
theories behind these provisions and their inclusion in joint operating
agreements will first be discussed. Then the pros and cons of including
these restrictions in joint operating agreements will be explored. Next,
this paper will analyze the potential dangers parties face if they blindly
incorporate standard joint operating agreement provisions. The paper
will conclude with a discussion of the practical and legal problems con-
Larson Operating Co. v. Petroleum, Inc., 84 P.3d 626, 631 (Kan. App. Ct. 2004).
2 Harlan Albright, Preferential Right Provisions and Their Applicability to Oil and
Gas Instruments, 32 S.W. L.J. 803, 804 (1978).
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ceming these restrictive provisions addressed by the courts in both Texas
and Louisiana, as well as selected case law from other states.
II. General Principles
A. Area of Mutual Interest
Generally, area of mutual interest provisions ("AMIs") will not be
included in joint operating agreements. The AAPL model form does not
even contain an AMI provision. But when properly drafted and incorpo-
rated into a joint operating agreement, an AMI can be a beneficial provi-
sion. An AMI grants each party to the operating agreement the opportu-
nity to acquire a proportional interest in each other party's acquisitions of
additional property within the area encompassed by the AMI. This area
may include property located around the contract area, or may extend
above and below the area of operations in anticipation of future acquisi-
tions or unitizations.
The primary purpose of an AMI is to afford those parties who are
mutually finding the exploration and development of the contract area
the benefits of these activities, jointly and proportionately. 4 The AMI
thus prevents one of the parties from utilizing the data obtained through
the joint development for its own personal gain.5 In addition, the AMI
promotes cooperative behavior among the parties by limiting competition
among them to acquire additional leases surrounding the contract area.
Except for the fact that AMI provisions affect the acquisition and
not the disposition of property, AMIs are analogous to preferential rights
to purchase provisions in operating agreements. Under an AMI, the ac-
quiring party is obligated to offer the to-be-purchased property within the
described AMI perimeter to the other parties to the agreement in propor-
tion to their interest. This is typically accomplished by giving notice of
the acquisition and its terms to all other parties to the joint operating
agreement, who then have an option for a stated time to elect to partici-
pate in the acquisition and reimburse the optionee his share of the acqui-
sition costs.7 The offer becomes a bilateral contract of sale only when
and if accepted by the optionee in the manner and within the time pre-
3 Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement - Interpretation,
Validity, and Enforceability, 19. TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1263, 1345 (1988).
4 Id. at 1345 n.322. See also Dante Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest Clauses Re-
garding Oil and Gas Properties: Analysis, Drafting and Procedure, 28 ROcKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 837, 839-40 (1983).
s See Conine, note 3 supra.
6 Terry I. Cross, The Ties That Bind: Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation
That Commonly Burden Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 193, 215
(1999).
7 See J-O'B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So.2d 852, 856 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1990) (costs of seismic program conducted by sublesSee held part of acquisition
costs to be reimbursed by electing participants).
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scribed. The specifics of the required form of notice, as well as those go-
verning acceptance, are guided by the AMI provision. Failure to provide
the prescribed notice can invalidate it, while failure to transmit accep-
tance can terminate the option rights at issue.8 Parties should take into
consideration these and other issues when drafting an AMI, as well as
when they are noticing or exercising the option.
B. Preferential Rights to Purchase
In contrast to AMIs, preferential rights to purchase provisions re-
strict the alienation of a party's interest in a mineral lease. A preferential
right, also called a right of first refusal, preemptive right or first option,
grants the holder the power to preempt a sale of the burdened property to
a third party by invoking the right and matching the purchase price. This
preferential right is distinguishable from an option in one key respect:
The holder cannot exercise his right until the owner of the burdened
property decides to sell.9
Preferential right provisions are included in operating agreements
and other oil and gas agreements for two primary reasons. First, the pro-
vision gives the holder the opportunity, although a contingent one, to
acquire future valuable interests in the burdened property. 0 Second, the
provision provides the holder some control over with whom he conducts
oil and gas operations pursuant to his interest in the joint operating
agreement. The holder has the option to purchase the offered interest in
order to keep undesirable third parties from participating in the develop-
ment and operation of the mineral interest.
Although not incorporated into joint operating agreements as fre-
quently as in the past, preferential right provisions are still commonly an
issue in the majority of mineral interest and surface property sales."
Thus, it behooves all parties to become familiar with these provisions
and understand how they may affect a proposed sale of a burdened prop-
erty. The language of the agreement granting the preferential right de-
termines the provision's application to the proposed transaction, with the
most common form of the provision contained in the AAPL Model Form
Operating Agreement. The 1989 edition of the Model Form, reproduced
in the footnotes,12 essentially requires the seller to provide written notice
See Conine, note 3 supra at 1346-47.
J. R. Cooney and L. P. Ausherman, Preferential Purchase Rights in Mineral
Agreements, 37 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, at 9-5 (1991).
10 See Albright, note 2 supra at 804.
" See Cross, note 6 supra at 194.
12 The 1989 AAPL Model Form provision on preferential rights, Section VIIIF, pro-
vides:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interest under this agreement, or
its rights and interest in the Contract Area, it shall promptly give written notice to
the other parties, with full information concerning its proposed disposition, which
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of the sale with the name of the buyer, the purchase price, and all other
terms of the offer, to the right holder, who then has ten days to respond.
The decision to include this model clause or a similar provision in the
joint operating agreement should not be taken lightly, considering the
difficulties its application may create for both the parties to the agree-
ment and any third-party purchaser.
C. Maintenance of Uniform Interests
Similar to a preferential right provision, a maintenance of uniform
interests provision ("MlI") is commonly included in joint operating
agreements to restrict the transfer of interests within the area covered by
the agreement. An MUI is considerably broader than the restrictions in a
preferential right, and applies to any transfer of interest whether by sale,
donation, encumbrance or exchange.' 3  Subject to other restrictions and
limitations contained in the operating agreement, an MUI permits a party
to dispose of its interest in leases, wells, equipment and production with-
in the covered area only if the transfer disposes of either all the party's
interest or an equal and undivided interest.14 An MJI protects the in-
vestment of the original parties by ensuring that all parties to the agree-
ment will be similarly situated and motivated. 5 The provision also at-
tempts to ensure the smooth functioning of the underlying operating
agreement, 6 by reducing the complexity in operations that would result
from multiple parties with fractional interests.
Mils are so common to operating agreements that the AAPL has
included a model provision in its form agreement since it was first pub-
lished in 1956." Although frequently included in operating agreements,
shall include the name and address of the prospective transferee (who must be
ready, willing and able to purchase), the purchase price, a legal description suffi-
cient to identify the property, and all other terms of the offer. The other parties shall
then have an optional prior right, for a period of ten (10) days after the notice is de-
livered, to purchase for the stated consideration on the same terms and conditions
the interest which the other party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exer-
cised, the purchasing parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions
that the interest of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties. How-
ever, there shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where any party
wishes to mortgage its interests, or to transfer title to its interests to its mortgagee in
lieu of or pursuant to foreclosure of a mortgage of its interests, or to dispose of its
interest by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or by sale of all or substantially
all of its Oil and Gas assets to any party, or by transfer of its interest to a subsidiary
or parent company or to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in
which such party owns a majority of the stock.
13 See Conine, note 3 supra at 1326.
1 Id. at 1325.
Is See Cross, note 6 supra at 213.
16 Id.
" Id. at 212. Section VIII.D of the 1989 AAPL form provides in part:
For the purpose of maintaining uniformity of ownership in the Contract Area in the
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arguably they are the most ignored and breached provision in the agree-
ments, and parties generally tolerate these breaches when noted.' 8 Parties
therefore should seriously consider whether to include these provisions
when drafting their operating agreement, focusing on their needs and
goals.
m. Pro and Con Considerations of Inclusion in the Agreement
A. The Pros of Inclusion
All three of these provisions have valid and beneficial purposes
which advocate for inclusion in a joint operating agreement, and their
value should nut be discounted. One benefit is that preferential rights,
AMIs, and MUls all restrict, in one form or another, the introduction of
third parties to the ongoing operation and development of the covered
area. Thus, these provisions give the participants more control over
whom they will do business with and to what extent a third party may
participate in the joint venture. Preferential rights provisions give the
holder the ability to preempt the introduction of an undesirable third par-
ty as a co-owner in the operation. By asserting the right of first refusal, a
holder can control the identity of his co-owners and exclude parties that
may be an economic risk or liability.
Maintenance of uniform interest provisions also help parties exert
some control over the addition of third parties in the joint venture. Al-
though MUls do not give a participant the ability to restrict who may
purchase an interest in the operations, they do restrict how many can do
so. Since a party may transfer only his entire interest or an equal undi-
vided portion of it, the MUI effectively reduces the number of parties
who may opt into the agreement through an assignment of interest. Area
of mutual interest provisions limit the ability of a party (perhaps jointly
with third parties) to acquire additional leases in the covered area, bene-
fitting from the data collected from joint operations. By requiring parties
to offer all acquired interests within the covered area to the co-parties for
purchase in proportion to each's share, the provision can restrict a third
party from joining in the operations.
Oil and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas Interests, wells, equipment and production cov-
ered by this agreement, no party shall sell, encumber, transfer or make other dispo-
sition of its interest in the Oil and Gas Leases and Oil and Gas Interests embraced
within the Contract Area or in wells, equipment and production unless such dispo-
sition covers either:
1. the entire interest of the party in all Oil and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas Interests,
wells, equipment and production; or
2. an equal undivided percent of the party's present interest in all Oil and Gas Leas-
es, Oil and Gas Interests, wells, equipment and production in the Contract Area.
Every sale, encumbrance, transfer or other disposition made by any party shall be
made expressly subject to this agreement....
is See Cross, note 6 supra at 213.
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By restricting the number and identity of parties who could be in-
cluded in the operation, the provisions also bring uniformity to the opera-
tion and development of the parties' venture. With this uniformity can
come the additional benefit of easing the problems associated with opera-
tions. The uniformity in ownership and interests resulting from the MJI
and preferential rights provisions insures both administrative efficiency
and continuation of the overall design of the operations.' 9 The operator is
able to complete the determined goals of the participants, as well as the
day-to-day operational tasks, without worrying about third parties with
contrary interests entering the venture and impeding the completion of
the original project. The resulting ease of operation is enhanced by the
uniformity of interests maintained by AMIs: Each party has the opportu-
nity to benefit continually in the same percentage as he bore in the initial
risk of the project.
AMIs also ease the operation of the joint project by reducing the
parties' competition for future acquisitions, since any acquisition of in-
terests in the contract area by one party must be offered proportionally to
the others.20 Such cooperation can reduce the cost of operation since the
parties are no longer rushed to purchase leases in an attempt to gain a
competitive edge.2' Finally, the restrictions on the sales of interest in the
covered area created by preferential rights and AMIs assure the right
holders in the prospect that they can acquire further interests in the cov-
ered area if such become available.22 An AMI is of particular benefit
when the operating agreement contract area is not fully leased at the time
of the agreement, because the provision ensures that each party will have
an equal opportunity to acquire additional interests and no participant can
obtain an interest to the exclusion of the others.
B. And, the Cons of Inclusion
As in all situations, with the good must come the bad. In addition to
the beneficial aspects of these provisions, there are also negative attrib-
utes. The most detrimental outcome is the reduced marketability of the
property interest resulting from the provisions' restrictions and limita-
tions on alienation. For example, assume Venturer is interested in Prop-
erty A owned by Seller B, which is subject to a joint operating agreement
which grants Owner P preferential rights to purchase. In order to deter-
mine the value of Property A, Venturer will invest a substantial amount
of time and money in surveys, testing, and evaluations of the property,
perhaps including its geophysical and seismic properties. Venturer then
offers Seller B $350,000 for his interest in the property. This offer is ac-
19 See Conine, note 3 supra at 1327.
20 See Cross, note 6 supra at 215.
21 Id. at 215-16.
2 See Conine, note 3 supra at 1317.
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ceptable to Seller B, but before he can accept and sell the property to
Venturer, Seller B must first offer the property to Owner P, the holder of
a preferential right to purchase Property A.
Pursuant to the terms of the provision, Seller B gives written notice
to Owner P of the offer to purchase, the offeror, the amount and terms.
Owner P has ten days to exercise his right of purchase. Venturer and Sel-
ler B must wait until Owner P makes his decision or the option lapses.
On the tenth day, Owner P contacts Seller B and informs him that he will
purchase the property interest at the offer price of $350,000. Venturer
has "made a market" for Property A to the benefit of Owner P, and is left
with nothing to show for his investment of time and money except for
testing invoices.
This scenario is not far-fetched but rather is a real possibility in pur-
chases involving preferential rights. Given the possible outcome of their
efforts, third-party purchasers like Venturer are likely to think twice
about investing time and money into a purchase agreement when the sub-
ject property is encumbered by a preferential right. Therefore the inclu-
sion of all or any of these three provisions restricting the ability to sell
and acquire property may protect the parties to the agreement, but at the
cost of reducing the marketability of the property interests.
IV. Drafting Issues: The Dangers of Boilerplate
A. Addressing the Parties' Needs and Narrowing the Scope of Provi-
sions
Another negative aspect to the inclusion of preferential rights, AMIs
or MUls is their potential ambiguity, which can result in problematic
interpretations and even protracted litigation. First and most important,
when drafting a joint operating agreement, care should be taken in de-
termining whether including any of these restrictive provisions is advis-
able, and if so, which of them is necessary given the needs and goals of
the parties. Using boilerplate language (like that found in the AAPL
Model Form provisions) without recognizing the potential consequences
can lead to problems in the acquisition and disposition of the property
interests. The operating agreement, which will govern the parties' rela-
tionship for the span of the operations, should address with particularity
those situations likely to arise during the course of the project.
When drafting the agreement and determining whether to include
these referenced restrictions on acquisition and disposition of the parties'
interests, the parties should determine whether the individual clause is
beneficial to the agreement. Preferential rights, although valuable to a
party desiring to increase his property interests, do impair the marketabil-
ity of the property. Additionally, the protection granted by this provision
is not fool-proof, and has even been circumvented by parties through
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strict reliance on the text of the provision.23 Therefore if the parties are
determined to include a preferential right to purchase provision, they
should specify the applicability and conditions of the right. Do they want
to restrict the right only to "sales" of the burdened interest, or do they
desire to include exchanges of properties as "sales" pursuant to the pro-
vision? Would the clause apply to a package sale in which the property is
included, and if so, could the right require the purchase of the entire
package, as opposed to only the burdened property? The same questions
should also arise when deciding whether to include AMIs or MUls in the
joint operating agreement.
When drafting an AMI clause, parties should be sure to use suffi-
cient land descriptions to set out the covered area in order to stem future
questions regarding its boundaries. They should also determine whether
to limit the term of the provisions and what effect such time limits will
have on the operations and the property itself. Most importantly, the par-
ties should recognize that when interpreting these clauses, the courts
have indicated that the specific language of the individual restrictive pro-
visions, including preferential rights, AMIs and MUIs, are key to the de-
termination of their applicability. 24 Thus, the parties should take extra
care in drafting the language of the provision to clearly indicate their
conditions and scope.
B. Ambiguity in the AAPL Model Form
As noted above, the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement, al-
though helpful as a guide when drafting a joint operating agreement, is
not without its faults. From its inception in 1956, to subsequent editions
in 1977, 1982 and 1989, the AAPL Model Form has attempted to address
the practical needs of the parties when entering into a general, or stan-
dard, joint operating agreement. Over the years, the AAPL Model Form
has addressed those controversial issues pertaining to preferential rights25
23 See Cross, note 6 supra at 230.
24 See ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co., 174 S.W.3d 303, 311-12 (Tex.
App. Ct. 2005) (maintenance of mutual interests); Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656
P.2d 538, 542 (Wy. 1982) (preferential rights); Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 312 S.W.2d 197, 208 (Tex. 1957) (area of mutual interest).
25 See note 12 supra for the. text of the 1989 AAPL Model Form provision on prefer-
ential rights. The 1982 version of this provision, Art. VIII.F, reads as follows:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interest under this agreement, or
its rights and interests in the Contract Area, it shall promptly give written notice to
the other parties, with full information concerning its proposed disposition, which
shall include the name and address of the prospective purchaser (who must be
ready, willing and able to purchase), the purchase price, and all other terms of the
offer. The other parties shall then have an optional prior right, for a period of ten
(10) days after receipt of the notice, to purchase on the same terms and conditions
the interest which the other party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exer-
cised, the purchasing parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions
that the interest of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties. How-
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and MUIS2 6 through marked changes in these provisions.2 7 However,
questions still arise regarding the meaning and interpretation of the pro-
visions and their application to the particular operating agreement.
The preferential rights provision in the AAPL Model Form is the
most commonly encountered limiting provision. But courts have found
it difficult to apply the provision's reference to "sell" 29 and to determine
when the right is triggered. The AAPL Model Form, in one scholar's
opinion, encourages an expansive reading of the term "sale." 30 He opines
that if the drafters had intended the provision to apply only to "cash
sales" of property, then the AAPL would not have had to add exclusion-
ary language regarding the application of the provision in subsequent
editions. In interpreting preferential rights provisions, courts have found
the term includes package sales3' and assignments of overriding royalty
rights,32 but not exchanges of interests33 or foreclosures. 34 Parties should
be mindful of these issues when incorporating the AAPL Model Form
ever, there shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where any party
wishes to mortgage its interests, or to dispose of its interests by merger, reorganiza-
tion, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of its assets to a subsidiary or
parent company or to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in
which any party owns a majority of the stock.
26 See note 17 supra for the text of the 1989 Model Form provision on MUls. The
1982 version of this provision, Art. VIII.D, provides in part:
For the purpose of maintaining uniformity of ownership in the oil and gas leasehold
interests covered by this agreement, no party shall sell, encumber, transfer or make
other disposition of its interest in the leases and Oil and Gas Interest embraced
within the Contract Area and in wells, equipment and production unless such dis-
position covers either:
1. the entire interest of the party in all leases and equipment and production; or
2. an equal undivided interest in all leases and equipment and production in the
Contract Area.
Every such sale, encumbrance, transfer or other disposition made by any party shall
be made expressly subject to this agreement....
27 As noted earlier, the AAPL Model Form does not address areas of mutual interest.
28 See Cross, note 6 supra at 195.
29 See section IV (B) supra.
30 See Cross, note 6 supra at 196.
31 See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that pref-
erential rights applied to package sale, but that right holder was not required to accept
entire package).
32 IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 911 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App. Ct.
1995).
3 Panuco Oil Leases, Inc. v. Conroe Drilling Co., 202 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1961)
(interpreting "drill to earn" agreement).
3 Draper v. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966). The 1989 AAPL Model Form
clarified any confusion regarding the applicability of the provision to foreclosures by
expressly excluding these actions from the provision.
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provisions into their operating agreement, and should determine whether
the specific language of the provision fits their needs and goals.
V. Practical and Legal Problems
A. Area of Mutual Interest
1. What Transfers Are Subject to the AMI?
Although the precise language of an AMI provision dictates its ap-
plicability to subsequent acquisitions, these provisions are generally
broad enough to include almost any acquisition. 5 Mineral leases, mineral
fees and servitudes, farmouts and subleases are acquisitions of interest
which by design may trigger the provision. But what about other trans-
fers of interests?
In Chevron USA, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,16 the Ninth Circuit
determined that the acquisition of corporate stock is not equivalent to
acquiring the assets of the corporation, and therefore did not trigger the
parties' AMI provision. Similarly, in Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co.,3 the court held that an overriding royalty interest obtained
during the course of a valid AMI provision is subject to the preferential
right to purchase provision, entitling the right holder to specific perform-
ance of the oblipation. The rights of assignees38 and acquisitions of prop-
erty by agents3' have also been adjudicated. Generally AMI provisions
will be applied broadly to subsequent acquisitions of interests, and likely
will result in subjecting these acquisitions to the right.
2. Other AMI Issues
Courts interpreting AMIs have dealt with a myriad of issues, and
have recognized that the provisions are governed by the law of contracts.
A court's reading of an AMI is thus restricted to the language of the pro-
vision and can only be supplemented by extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent when the agreement is ambiguous.
In exercising the AMI option, parties elect to participate in the ac-
quisition of the additional interest. Allocation of acquisition costs must
be proportionate to each party's share of the additional interest, and in-
cludes those costs incurred by the acquiring party as part of the investiga-
tion and negotiation of the purchase.4 1 Courts have not allowed condi-
" See Cross, note 6 supra at 217.
3 73 Fed.Appx. 984 (9th Cir. 2003).
3" 312 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. 1957).
3 Slawson Expl. Co. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (finding that assignee
was right holder pursuant to language of assignment).
3 Petrocana, Inc. v. William H. Kennedy Consultants, Ltd., 595 So.2d 384 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1992).
40 See Kincaid v. Western Operating Co., 890 P.2d 249, 252 (Colo. App. Ct. 1994).
4 See J-O'B Operating Co., v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So.2d 852, 859 (La. App. 3d
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tional elections of this right, requiring parties to elect to participate en-
tirely pursuant to the terms of the agreement, or to be considered to have
elected not to participate.4 2 Furthermore, the equitable doctrine of estop-
pel acts to deny participation to those parties who allege their failure to
elect timely was the result of deficient notice, when the party in question
has already retained the benefits of the transfer it seeks to nullify.
3. Covenants Running With the Land?
Whether an AMI is a covenant running with the land or is a personal
covenant is key in determining its applicability to a successor or as-
signee. In Mountain West Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Chffs Iron Co.," the
district court was required to determine whether an AMI clause was a
personal covenant or a covenant burdening the land in order to determine
the right to royalty payments. If the AMI ran with the land, the succes-
sors of Cliffs would be bound by the clause; if it was personal to the par-
ties, then the successors would not be bound. According to Wyoming
law, four elements must be met to establish that a covenant runs with the
land: (1) the original covenant must be enforceable; (2) the parties must
intend that the covenant run with the land; (3) the covenant must touch
and concern the land; and (4) there must be privity of estate between the
parties. 45 The district court recognized that other jurisdictions have found
that covenants run with the land, thus binding the successors in interest
to the AMI. But the court concluded that no privity of estate existed be-
tween the parties and ruled that the covenant at issue was personal to the
owner. Therefore the AMI clause did not run with the land and plaintiff
could not assert its claim against Cliffs' successors.4
B. Preferential Rights
1. What Triggers the Holder's Right?
a. Sales and Leases
Section VIII.F of the 1989 AAPL Model Form is the preferential
right to purchase provision. 4 7 The Model Form indicates that this prefer-
ential right is triggered by a party's "desire to sell all or any part of its
interests under the agreement.""8 This definition allows for a broad range
Cir. 1990) (costs incurred in seismic program held to be acquisition costs reimbursable by
parties exercising right under AMI).
42 Id.
43 Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1953).
4 376 F. Supp.2d 1298 (D. Wy. 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
410 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2006).
4s Id. at 1304.
46 Id. at 1308.
4 See note 12 supra.
4s Id.
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of interpretations of which actions trigger the right. Generally, a "sale"
for the purposes of this provision is defined as "a voluntary, arm's-length
transfer which, if completed, would put the property beyond the reach of
the preference right holder."49 This definition naturally encompasses the
typical cash sale. Courts' interpretations, however, suggest that almost
any conveyance or transfer "for value" will be considered a "sale" for
purposes of preferential rights.s0 Courts have also held that oil and gas
leases and mineral leases are sales within the purview of this provision,
triggering the holder's right.5 ' In Barela v. Locer, the Texas Supreme
Court found that mineral leases convey a property interest, and in fact
represent an "acquisition of mineral interests" equivalent to a sale.52
In contrast, transfers which are not accomplished through an arm's-
length transaction and do not put the property beyond the reach of the
right holder are not considered a "sale" for the purposes of the right.
Gifts,sa donations, and transfers resulting from the death of the owner
either by will or intestate succession generally are outside the coverage
of the provision and are not considered "sales."54
b. Overriding royalty interests
Some case law supports the view that a transfer of an overriding
royalty interest is a sale which triggers a preferential right to purchase. In
IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp.,ss the court held that the
sale of an overriding royalty interest prompted the preferential right in an
operating agreement. In its decision, the court gave weight to an unspeci-
fied provision in the operating agreement that expressly provided that
any overriding royalty interest created would be subject to the terms of
the operating agreement. Since the court's decision turned on other lan-
guage in the operating agreement, the precedential weight of this deci-
sion is not clear. But if overriding royalty interests do trigger preferential
rights, there are implications for employees, independent contractors, and
lenders who use overriding royalties as partial compensation or as part of
a financing transaction.
c. Sales to Existing Owners, Mergers, and Intra-Company Transfers
The AAPL Model Form provision contains no express language that
would exclude a sale to a party who already owns an interest in the con-
49 See Cooney, note 9 supra at 9-16.
0 See Cross, note 6 supra at 196.
s1 See Barela v. Locer, 708 P.2d 307, 311 (N.M. 1985); Cherokee Water Co. v. For-
derhause, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
52 Barela, 708 P.2d at 310-11.
s3 Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 544 (Wy. 1982) (transfer of overrid-
ing royalty interest to one's children held gift, not sale).
5 See Cross, note 6 supra at 196.
ss 911 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. App. Ct. 1995).
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tract area. But such a sale would not contravene one of the purposes of
this provision-the exclusion of unsavory potential owners-and so
should not be subject to the provision.5
Transfers of interest resulting from mergers are expressly excluded
from consideration as sales by the 1989 Model Form provision. In addi-
tion, although not expressly excluded by the terms of the agreement,
transfers of leased property or other interests to a subsidiary or parent
company have been held to be non-triggering actions. In Creque v. Tex-
aco Antilles Ltd.,57 the Third Circuit concluded that a conveyance of in-
terest from the grantor to his wholly owned corporation did not implicate
the provision. First, the court noted that the transaction did not result
from an arm's-length dealing between commercially related parties,
which alone should preclude the exercise of the right.58 Second, the court
recognized that rights of first refusal, or preferential rights, are not tradi-
tionally triggered where the evidence indicates that the transfer was from
one corporation to another owned and controlled by the same interests.59
The court held that both of these factors applied to the current transfer;
therefore the conveyance did not change ownership or control and did
not trigger a right of first refusal.
d. Stock Transfers
In Fina Oil and Chemical Co. v. Amoco Production Co.,60 a Louisi-
ana appellate court held that the sale of all the corporate stock of a corpo-
ration's subsidiary to a buyer was not a transfer of oil and gas lease inter-
ests which would trigger the holder's preferential rights option to pur-
chase under the joint operating agreement. Amoco had transferred its
lease interests in three fields to a subsidiary corporation, MW Petroleum
Corporation, whose total interest in stock was subsequently purchased by
Apache Corporation. Fina Oil and Chemical Company, a non-operator
interest holder in the three fields, challenged Amoco's transfer and in-
sisted that it had triggered Fina's preferential rights to purchase. The
court disagreed with Fina, finding that a transfer to a subsidiary was one
of the recognized exemptions to the preferential rights.6' Amoco's trans-
fer to its subsidiary MW as a consequence of Amoco's self-described
internal reorganization was therefore excluded as a triggering sale.62
MW's subsequent stock sale to Apache also did not implicate the hold-
er's rights: The court held that a sale of corporate shares is not a sale of
% See Texas Co. v. Graf, 221 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App. Ct. 1949).
s' 409 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
5 Id. at 154.
s9 Id.
60 673 So.2d 668 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
61 Id. at 671.
62 Id. at 672.
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assets, since under Louisiana law the individual shareholders own stock
in the company, not proportions of the assets of the corporation.63 There-
fore no sale or transfer of lease interests by MW had occurred to trigger
the preferential right clauses."
e. Exchanges
Whether an exchange of properties triggers a preferential right when
the provision does not specifically address the topic is a question with
which courts still wrestle. In Panuco Oil Leases, Inc. v. Conroe Drilling
Co.,65 a Texas appellate court held that an exchange of interests between
an assignee and subassignee in consideration of the subassignee's
agreement to drill the well deeper was not a sale within contemplation of
the riht of first refusal clause. Similarly, in LeBreton v. Allain-LeBreton
Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal determined that a
right of first refusal in a partnership agreement was not triggered by an
exchange of an interest in that partnership for an interest in another. Like
the AAPL Model Form, the partnership agreement expressly applied on-
ly to "sales." The court noted that the Civil Code defines sales and ex-
changes differently, with a sale requiring the thing, the price in money,
and consent, while an exchange merely requires a giving of one thing for
another, without money. The court concluded that since the transfer
was an exchange, it did not fall within the purview of the right of first
refusal clause.
f. Involuntary Sales
The express exclusion for foreclosure sales added to the 1989
AAPL Model Form solidified the answer to the primary issue regarding
involuntary sales-are foreclosures excluded since they do not fall un-
der the "desire to sell" language of the provision? Although foreclosure
sales are now clearly excluded from the preferential rights clause, the
issue of involuntary sales still has relevance. In Benefit Realty Corp. v.
City of Carrollton,9 the court held the Church's sale to the city under the
threat of condemnation procedures was a forced sale, therefore, Benefit
Realty Corporation's right of first refusal never accrued. Since the
Church never "desire[d] to sell," the sale never came under the purview
of the preferential right provision.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 673.
65 202 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
6 631 So.2d 662 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So.2d 159 (La. 1994).
67 631 So.2d at 666.
6 Id.
69 141 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App. Ct. 2004).
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2. Package Sales
The issue whether package sales trigger preferential rights is com-
plex. There are several facets to the inquiry into these sales. When the
property holder offers to sell, or receives an offer to purchase, a package
of properties not all of which are burdened by preferential rights, the
question arises regarding what is a sufficient presentment of the offer to
the right holder.
In Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. 70 the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals faced such an issue. Texaco Exploration and Produc-
tion, Inc. ("TEPI") had negotiated to sell to a third party a large group of
its properties, which it called the "Gulf Coast Package." Included in the
package were properties in the Fordoche Field in Pointe Coupee Parish,
Louisiana, which were covered by one of four joint operating agree-
ments. One of these had been executed in 1962, two in 1969, and one in
1995. The preferential rights provisions in the 1969 and 1995 agreements
affected only the sale by a party of its interest in "unitized substances,"
gas and condensate produced from the leases. The 1962 agreement, by
contrast, affected a party's entire interest in the leases governed by the
agreement.
TEPI had given notice to the other parties to the operating agree-
ments, called the "Fordoche Group," of its intention to sell. Taking the
position that the Fordoche Group had not properly exercised its preferen-
tial rights in response to the notice, TEPI then proceeded to sell the prop-
erties to the third party. The Fordoche Group sued, and TEPI prevailed
on a motion for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit, reversing, held
that the notice insufficiently described the proposed sale, insofar as same
affected the Fordoche Group's rights under the preferential rights provi-
sions, in several respects. According to the Fifth Circuit, TEPI's notice
understated the scope of the Fordoche Group's preferential rights, and
did not clearly describe the particular property interests TEPI proposed to
sell to the third party. The Fifth Circuit therefore remanded the case to
the district court.
If an operating agreement containing a preferential rights provision
governs several wells, and a party contracts to sell his interest in all of
the wells, may the right holder who receives notice exercise his preferen-
tial rights to some but not all of the tendered properties? Not according to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Samson Resources Co.,71
a party to operating agreement entered into a purchase and sale agree-
ment with a third party to sell several properties. A schedule attached to
the purchase and sale agreement allocated values to the various proper-
ties, so the purchase price could be decreased if any properties were
70 463 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2006).
7 229 F.3d 1162, 2000 WL 1234851 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
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pulled from the deal because of an exercise of preferential rights. Two
wells included in the purchase and sale agreement were subject to a sin-
gle operating agreement, which included a preferential rights provision.
When the right holder was tendered those two properties, it attempted to
elect as to only one of them, using the value allocated in the schedule to
the purchase and sale agreement.
In the ensuing litigation the right holder prevailed before the district
court, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The court held
that, consistent with the nature of a preferential right, the right holder had
to match not only the price, but also the terms and conditions of the third
party's offer. The allocation schedule attached to the purchase and sale
agreement did not change the conditions that the right holder had to
meet:
These provisions do not change the fundamental character of the
sale.... Huber entered into a proposed sale of both properties to-
gether, for a listed price. In order to offer Huber the identical terms,
Samson was required to match the offer.... Samson was entitled to
either accept or reject the offer in its entirety.72
The Tenth Circuit therefore held that the right holder's attempted accep-
tance varying the terms of the offer was ineffective, and left the selling
party free to transfer the tendered properties to the third party pursuant to
the purchase and sale agreement.
Another problematic aspect of describing preferential rights-
burdened properties in a package sale has been addressed by the Texas
Supreme Court. In McMillan v. Dooley,73 the court held that the inclu-
sion of leases that were not subject to preferential rights in the package
sale offer presented to Dooley did not violate the express terms of the
preferential purchase provision.74 The court determined that the present-
ment was sufficient because the property holder made a reasonable dis-
closure of the terms of the contemplated conveyance." The fact that the
presentment included properties not subject to his preferential rights did
not affect its sufficiency. 6 But the court did conclude that Dooley was
not required to accept the other leases in order to exercise his rights."
The court opined that because a right holder is not permitted to expand
his right to additional properties, neither would it be proper to require
him to accept additional, uncovered properties.
72 Id., *4-*5.
7 144 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App. Ct. 2004).
7 Id. at 177.
7s Id.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 178.
78 Id. at 179.
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A recent decision by a Texas appellate court, Navasota Resources,
L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc.," addressed several preferential rights
issues, some of which relate to package sales. The court analyzed years
of case law on rights of first refusal and preferential rights, and rendered
an opinion that adds to the lines of authority supporting the following
principles:
(i) Once the prospective seller gives notice of his intent to sell,
he cannot change the terms of the option for as long as it is open.
The right holder, for its part, may only exercise its option in un-
qualified, unambiguous and strictly compliant terms, accepting all
of the terms of the offer. When this acceptance occurs, a binding
contract to sell is created.
(ii) A preferential right burdening some but not all of properties
included in a proposed package sale may be exercised as to the bur-
dened properties only.
(iii) The right holder cannot be compelled to purchase assets
"beyond those included within the scope of the [operating] agree-
ment"80 in order to exercise his preferential right.
(iv) Preferential rights generally are not unreasonable restraints
on alienation, consistent with the Restatement (3d) of Property, if
the procedures for exercising those rights are clear, the time in
which they may be exercised is short, and the right to purchase is on
the same terms and conditions as the owner may receive from a
third party.
(v) A right holder who receives an offer that attempts to impose
unwarranted conditions on the exercise of his right should respond
promptly by notifying the offeror of his exercise of his actual rights
and his objection to the offeror's attempt to vary them.
Based on McMillan and Navasota, Texas courts are more likely not
to invalidate a preferential right in a package sale context, but would not
require the right holder to exercise this right on uncovered properties.8'
Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that the right holder may ex-
ercise his right only against the subject property,82 even if offered other,
non-burdened properties. State courts have yet to come to a consensus on
how to balance the right of the holder to exercise his privilege with the
right of the property holder to sell his property.
79 249 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App. Ct. 2008).
so Id. at 535.
st See also Riley v. Campeau Homes (Texas), Inc., 808 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App. Ct.
1991).
82 See Maron v. Howard, 258 Cal.App.2d 473 (1968).
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3. Invocation ofRight
Once a right holder is given notice of a bona fide offer pursuant to
the terms of the right-granting provision, he has a limited time to accept
the offer and purchase the property at the offered price and conditions, or
will have waived his right to purchase. The information and terms re-
quired for a conforming notice are stipulated by the parties in the prefer-
ential right provision. If a party does not receive the actual, stipulated
notice of the offer, his period for exercising his right should not begin
and he should be able to request a conforming notice. But if the right
holder is imputed with actual knowledge of the offer despite a noncon-
forming notice, his right will not continue indefinitely. When the right
holder learns of the offer, he has ten days or any other period agreed
upon in the provision to give notice of his intent to exercise or waive his
right. The holder may also be held to have waived any right to acquire
the interest sold if he remains silent for an unreasonable length of time. 84
Lastly, the holder of a preferential right may not compel the property
owner to sell until the right is triggered,"8 but once the right is triggered
the holder must exercise his option or risk losing his right.
4. Remedies
Once a court has found that a preferential right exists and has been
breached, the issue becomes one of remedies: What remedies are avail-
able, and how is the burdened interest valued? Courts generally may
choose among specific performance, injunctive relief, or damages, but
the choice of remedies will likely be governed by the specific statutes of
the situs state. When the property or interest has been offered or sold as
part of a package, the task of valuing the burdened interest begins. Courts
have generally taken one of three approaches in such circumstances: (1)
enjoin the sale and any subsequent sales until the owner honors the pro-
vision; (2) order specific performance for the right holder and value the
interest according to its percentage of the entire purchase price; or (3)
recognize the preferential right and allow the holder to exercise it over
the entire package of properties.u
C. Maintenance of Uniform Interests
1. Scope of Right
Although the MUI provision has been included in the AAPL Model
Form since 1956, the provision is often ignored by the parties, and it is
93 See Exeter Expl. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 661 P.2d 1255 (Mo. 1983) (right holder held
precluded from exercising privilege since he did not attempt to exercise same until 15
months after actual knowledge of offer).
4 See Marken v. Goodall, 357 F. Supp. 317, 320 (D. Wy. 1972).
8 Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Pernmian Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 577, 589(Tex. App. Ct. 2005).
6 See Albright, note 2 supra at 816-18.
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subject to different interpretations.87 The provision applies to leases with-
in the covered area, but does it include mineral interests which might
become leased and then governed by the operating agreement?" The
provision does not give guidance on how to incorporate such interests
and case law has yet to address this topic specifically.
Additionally, the legal relationship of the parties to a joint operating
agreement varies pursuant to each agreement. Some operating agree-
ments create a co-ownership relationship among the parties by cross-
assigning the leases subject to the agreement.89 The extent to which an
MUI should be applied outside of this scheme has not yet been addressed
by the courts. What would result from its application to individually
owned leases is not certain, but such application could result in a lack of
uniformity of interests due to the nature of the individually owned lease.
2. Interaction With Other Contractual Rights
One reason why MUIs are sometimes ignored by the parties when
drafting an agreement and performing the contracted operations may be
the negative impact the provision can have on other provisions in the
operating agreement. In Samson Resources Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,9
an Oklahoma court held that in order to comply with both the MUI and
preferential rights provisions in the context of a package sale offer, the
right holder was required to either accept or reject the package as a
whole.
Amerada Hess Corporation and Samson Resources Company were
parties to three joint operating agreements, all of which contained both
preferential rights to purchase and maintenance of uniform interests pro-
visions. In April 1996, Amerada entered into a contract to sell its interest
in hundreds of leases to DLB for $35,028,000. Amerada and DLB had
agreed to allocate the purchase price among the assets based on the fair
market values.
Pursuant to the preferential rights provision in the three joint operat-
ing agreements, Amerada sent three letters to Samson notifying it that
Amerada was selling its interest in various wells. In response to two of
the letters, Samson elected to purchase only part of Amerada's interest in
two of the operating agreements. In its response to the third letter Sam-
son elected to purchase Amerada's entire interest in the joint operating
agreement. Amerada responded that it did not consider Samson's elec-
tions to be valid. Subsequently Amerada sold its property interests to
DLB, and Samson then filed suit against both Amerada and DLB, seek-
87 See Cross, note 6 supra at 213.
88 See Conine, note 3 supra at 1326.
* Id. at 1326-27.
90 41 P.3d 1055, 1059 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).
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ing specific performance of the preferential rights provision. The trial
court granted Samson's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Amerada and DLB contended that Samson's attempt to
purchase only a portion of the interests under the two joint operating
agreements violated both the preferential rights and MUI clauses. Defen-
dants claimed that under the joint operating agreement, Samson was re-
quired to either accept or reject all of the offered interests, and that its
failure to accept all of the offered interests should be deemed a rejection
of all of them.
The court agreed with the defendants, finding that the MUI provi-
sions in the operating agreements constrained the terms upon which
Amerada could offer its interests to DLB.91 The contract to purchase be-
tween Amerada and DLB was subject to the MUI clauses, which re-
quired Amerada to sell its interest in all the leases or an equal undivided
interest in all of the leases. 92 Complying with the MUI clauses, Amerada
had duly offered Samson its entire interest in all the leases. The court
found that in order to accept the offer, Samson was required to accept the
condition and purchase Amerada's entire interests covered by the joint
operating agreements. 94 Since Samson's acceptance was only for a por-
tion of Amerada's interest, the court concluded that it was not a proper
exercise of its preferential rights.
Similarly, in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.,9 a Texas
appellate court held that a farmout agreement violated the operating
agreement's clause on maintenance of interests. The court characterized
the farmout agreement among ExxonMobil, Wagner & Brown, Ltd. and
C.W. Resources as a transfer or agreement to transfer, thus triggering the
maintenance-of-interest provision in the joint operating agreement.97
Since the farmout agreement contained depth limitations which restricted
the conveyance, the offer did not encompass the entire leasehold portion
of the interest, nor did it constitute an undivided interest in the portion.98
Therefore the court concluded that ExxonMobil's farmout and offer to
assign breached the maintenance-of-interest provision.9
91 Id. at 1059.
92 Id.
93 Id.
9 Id. at 1060.
95 Id.
96 174 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App. Ct. 2005).
9 Id. at 313.
9 Id.
* Id. at 314.
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Both the Samson and Valence courts relied heavily on the MUI pro-
visions' restrictions on alienation in their conclusions. The fact that in
Valence the MUI provision governed instead of the farmout agreemen is
not surprising. But it must be noted that in Samson the court relied upon
the MUI provision instead of basic contract law or the preferential right
provision exclusively. Whether courts will continue to find the terms of
the MUI provision as the governing law remains to be seen. These two
cases indicate that courts are likely to rely on the interpretation of the
MUI provisions and find in favor of maintaining the bargained-for uni-
formity and ease of operation.
D. Other Problems
1. Rule Against Restraints on Alienation and
Rule Against Perpetuities
The rules against restraints on alienation and against perpetuities
embody judicial policy that agreements that unreasonably restrict free
alienability of property are not enforceable.'" These policies promote
full utilization and transferability of land.1 'o Thus, the determination
whether a preferential right, area of mutual interest, or maintenance of
uniform interest provision violates the rules against restraints on alien-
ation or against perpetuities is contingent on whether the restraint is un-
reasonable. 0 2
Preferential rights, AMIs and MUIs by definition restrain the free
alienability of the subject property. These restraints do interfere with the
property holder's right to select to whom he wants to sell, and do dis-
courage third party interest in the property because of the difficulties and
restraints placed on the sale. Nonetheless these restrictions are not unrea-
sonable per se. 03 The generally accepted view is that the restraints
placed by these provisions are indirect and ancillary to a legitimate pur-
pose.N
In Lawson v. Redmoor Corp.,05 the court set out the factors to de-
termine whether a preferential right "unreasonably" restricts alienation:
(1) whether the party imposing the restraint has an interest in the land he
is seeking to protect by enforcement of the restraint; (2) whether the re-
straint is limited in effect; (3) whether the enforcement of the restraint
accomplishes a worthwhile purpose; and (4) whether the number of per-
sons affected by the restraint is small.'" Additionally, in First National
10 See Cooney, note 9 supra at 9-11.
30 Id. at 9-14.
1o2 Id.
03 Id.
'0 See Albright, note 2 supra at 807.
los 679 P.2d 972, 974 (Wash. App. Ct. 1984).
10 Id.
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Bank and Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp.,o7 the Kansas Supreme Court noted
that "[t]here are limits on the operation of the rule against perpetui-
ties.... A transaction which is exclusively contractual is not subject to
the rule against perpetuities." 08 Courts have continually recognized that
restraints on alienation imposed by AMIs'" and preferential rights 0 do
not violate the rule against restraints on alienation because these re-
straints are not unreasonable. However, one court has invalidated prefer-
ential rights provisions on the grounds that they violated the rule against
restraints on alienation, when the right had no time limit within which
the holder was required to act, set forth no procedural guidelines to fol-
low, and required unreasonable concessions. 1
The rule against perpetuities at common law generally requires that
a party have a valid contingent interest in property that must vest within
a lifetime." 2 Most states have some form of rule against perpetuities. If
an option or restrictive right has no time limit, courts generally will try to
interpret the right to be valid for a reasonable period."'3 However, if the
option or right is intended to be unlimited in duration, then it is void un-
der the rule against perpetuities.
Although the rules against restraints on alienation and against perpe-
tuities are rarely considered violated by preferential rights, AMIs and
MUIs, these rules should be considered when drafting and interpreting
these rights. One should be cautious not to grant rights that are unlimited
in duration, are for a questionable commercial purpose, or that stipulate a
fixed price lower than market value.' 14 If these are avoided when drafting
the provisions, the rules should not affect the enforceability of the provi-
sions.
2. Statute ofFrauds
Most states treat mineral interests and oil and gas leaseholds as in-
terests in real property." 5 Therefore these interests are subject to the
rules relating to real property, including the statute of frauds." 6 Gener-
ally, the statute of frauds requires that an agreement pertaining to the
107 678 P.2d 118 (Kan. 1984).
10. Id. at 875.
'0 See Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. Ct.
1953).
110 See Forderhause v. Cherokee Water Co., 623 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 641 S.W. 2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
" Girard v. Myers, 694 P.2d 678 (Wash. App. Ct. 1985).
112 See Albright, note 2 supra at 808-09.
113 Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1963).
114 See Cooney, note 9 supra at 9-14.
11s See Conine, note 3 supra at 1371.
116 Id.
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transfer of real property be in writing and signed by the party bound by
its terms in order to be effective." 7 Although some states do not subject
oil and gas leases to the statute of frauds," 8 many others do."'9 In addi-
tion, provisions in operating agreements that involve transfers or assign-
ments of real property interests must comply with the statute of frauds to
be enforceable.
In order to ensure compliance with the statute of frauds, parties
drafting these provisions must be sure that all blanks are filled and op-
tions selected. With respect to the description of the covered area or
property, parties should take care to ensure its accuracy, which can be
facilitated by incorporating lease descriptions by reference to the original
instrument.120
3. Recordation and Notice to Third Parties
In addition to the requirements of form which must be followed in
order for the instrument creating the right to be valid among the parties,
another step is sometimes necessary to enforce the right against third
persons. Some states require that notice of the right burdening the prop-
erty or interest be given to third parties. This is usually accomplished by
recordation of the instrument creating the right or of another document
prescribed by law. Not all instruments require recordation for notice, but
if the instrument does affect rights in real property, it is best to err on the
side of recordation.
In Louisiana, the public records doctrine provides that all "sales,
contracts and judgments" affecting immovable property' 2 1 are not effec-
tive as to third parties until recorded in the public records.122 This doc-
trine is grounded in Louisiana's public policy favoring the free use and
transferability of immovable property. The Louisiana Civil Code specifi-
cally applies the public records doctrine to options, rights of first refusal
and contracts to sell immovables.'23 Thus in Louisiana, failure to record
an operating agreement or declaration 2 4 of same in the proper parish re-
cords will result in a preferential right, AMI or MUI having no effect on
17 Id. Louisiana does not have a statute of frauds per se. However, La. Civ. Code art.
1839 requires that all transfers of immovable property be made by authentic act or by act
under private signature, both of which require a signed writing.
"M See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §26.01.
119 See Conine, note 3 supra at 1371.
120 Id. at 1374.
121 La. R.S. 31:18 classifies mineral rights as incorporeal immovables.
122 La. R.S. 9:2756.
123 La. Civ. Code art. 2629.
124 La. R.S. 9:2732.
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third parties, even if such parties have actual notice of the unrecorded
agreement.125
VI. Conclusion
Parties should be watchful when incorporating preferential rights,
area of mutual interest, or maintenance of uniform interest provisions
into operating agreements. Instead of blindly relying on model contracts
available throughout the oil and gas industry, the parties should use these
models merely as guides for their own agreements. Before inserting any
restrictive clauses in their operating agreement, parties should weigh the
risks of their incorporation against the possible benefits of inclusion. If
they decide to include any restrictive provision in their joint operating
agreement, the parties should tailor the provision to meet their particular
needs.
SOS~rX) - (CCCC
125 Blevins v. Mfrs. Record Publ. Co., 105 So.2d 392 (La. 1958); McDuffie v. Walker,
51 So. 100 (La. 1909).
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